The UN and SSR in Timor-Leste September 2009 University of York MA

The United Nations and Security Sector
Reform: Lessons from the Field
Michael Gillespie
Master of Arts Post War Recovery Studies
University of York
Post War Reconstruction and Development Unit
September 2009

Abstract

Security Sector Reform has the potential to enable the emergence of a sustainable peace and move a post conflict state into long term development, the UN has a unique position in post conflict environments but has yet to formulate a comprehensive approach to SSR. This paper seeks to analyse the security sector reform activities that the current UN peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste is engaging in with a view to making recommendations for the future development of a comprehensive UN approach to SSR. The paper explores the debate around SSR as well as tracing the UN’s previous engagements with the security sector. This will provide the context to use Timor-Leste as a case study in order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the UN’s role in SSR there. It will be argued that the UN mission has been constrained by a lack of prioritisation of SSR, a poor understanding of SSR theory within the UN family and mission leadership as well as the legacy of the UN’s past mistakes. It is clear that these mistakes have the potential to be repeated in future missions and so it is vital that the lessons from the mission be learned and changes put into effect.

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UN and SSR Lessons from the Field, Timor-Leste.pdf

Tim Bakorsurtanal Survey Batas RI-Timor Leste

Tim Bakorsurtanal Survey Batas RI-Timor Leste
Kamis, 01 October 2009 15:32 WIB
http://www.tvone.co.id/berita/view/24451/2009/10/01/tim_bakorsurtanal_survey_batas_ritimor_leste

Kupang, (tvOne)

Tim Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan Nasional (Bakosurtanal) yang diketuai Dr. Sri Handoyo mulai melakukan survey dan pemetaan batas wilayah negara antara Indonesia dan Timor Leste.

“Tim dari Bakosurtanal tersebut telah melakukan survey di lokasi perbatasan antara Indonesia dan Timor Leste,” kata Kepala Biro Tata Pemerintahan Setda Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) Ricard Djami di Kupang, Kamis.

Tim Bakosurtanal tersebut terdiri atas delapan anggota yang juga melibatkan pihak TNI Polri dalam melakukan survey demarkasi perbatasan darat antara Indonesia dan Timor Leste. Tim ini sudah melakukan survey sejak 25 September 2009 dan akan berakhir pada 28 November mendatang.

Dia mengatakan, tim tersebut akan melakukan survey di beberapa lokasi perbatasan antara Kabupaten Kupang dan distrik Oeccuse, Timor Tengah Utara (TTU) juga dengan distrik Oeccuse serta Kabupaten Belu yang berbatasan langsung dengan Timor Leste.

Dalam survey tersebut, jelas Ricard, tim akan bergabung dengan tim Timor Leste karena penetapan batas harus melalui kesepakatan kedua tim sehingga dapat dipancang pilar perbatasan di lokasi yang ditetapkan berasama. “Kedua tim tersebut bekerja sama dalam menentukan batas wilayah antara Indonesia dan Timor Leste,” katanya.

Namun, dia mengaku tidak mengetahui berapa banyak anggota tim dari Timor Leste. Menyangkut penyerobotan lahan yang terjadi di Naktuka Desa Netemnanu, Kabupaten Kupang, Ricard menjelaskan, tim survey Bakosurtanal tersebut tidak hanya menyelesaikan batas wilayah di lokasi tersebut, tapi lokasi batas yang masih disengketakan.

Sampai saat ini masih terdapat lima titik batas antara Indonesia dan Timor Leste yang belum terselesaikan yakni Imbate, Sumkaen, Haumeniana, Nilulat dan Tubana yang didalamnya termasuk Naktuka yang berbatasan antara Oecusse dan Kabupaten Timor Tengah Utara (TTU).

Guna penyelesaian penyerobotan lahan di Naktuka Desa Netemnanu, lanjut Ricard, Bupati Kupang, Ayub Titu Eki bersama tim dari Kabupaten dan Provinsi pada 15 Oktober 2009 akan meninjau langsung lokasi penyerobotan lahan tersebut. “Bupati Titu Eki meninjau lokasi tersebut tidak sebagai Bupati, tapi sebagai tokoh adat,” katanya. (Ant)

Dragon di Timor-Leste KOMPAS 30 Juli 2009

kompas dragon di timor leste 300709

PESKIZA KONA BA PERCEPSAUN POLISIA-COMMUNIDADE: Timor-Leste 2008

Husi Asia Foundation http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/513

1. Sumáriu Ezekutivu

1.1 Kontestu Peskiza nian

Kompleksidade hosi persepsaun públiku sira polísia, krimi no siguransa nian iha Timor-Leste refleta kompleksidade hosi tranzisaun iha Timor Leste hosi independénsia to’o soberania. Hafoin liu tinan 400 hosi influénsia kolonizasaun Portugueza nian no okupasaun Indonézia nian durante tinan 24, forsa pro-Indonézia sira estraga ona pursentu 80 hosi infrastrutura nasaun ne’e nian hafoin konsultasaun populár iha loron 30 Agostu 1999 ne’ebé pursentu 78,5 hosi populasaun Timor-Leste sira vota ba independénsia maski iha intimidasaun ne’ebé boot. Kuaze funsionáriu sivíl kualifikadu sira mak halai husik hela nasaun ne’e. Iha tinan sia liuba iha asisténsia internasionál nian ho nível boot ne’ebé serví ona hodi fornese funsaun sira estadu nian ida enkuantu, iha tempu ne’ebé hanesan sira estabelese rasik estadu.

Okupasaun Indonézia nian iha efeitu ne’ebé dura ba instituisaun hot-hotu. Notavelmente,Timor-Leste hela deit ho rekursu umanu ke uituan hodi kria instituisaun sira ne’ebé forte no kredivel hodi rezolve lakuna ne’ebé boot iha siguransa umanu nian. Administrasaun tranzisionál ONU nian (UNTAET) forma ona Servisu Polísia Timor-Leste (hafoin ne’e sai fali Polísia Nasionál Timor-Leste, PNTL) ho nasionalidade Timor-Leste sira. Só deit ofisiál hamutuk pursentu sanulu hosi servisu polísia nasionál forte nain 3,000 mak iha ona esperiénsia polisiamentu nian anteriór no sira ne’e hosi serví iha servisu Polísia Indonézia nia
laran (POLRI). Ho badak, servisu polísia Timor-Leste nian estabelese hosi baze iha administrasaun tranzisionál ida nia laran ne’ebé inisialmente laiha fundasaun primeiru sira hosi estadu ida hodi apoia polísia hanesan instituisaun ida, tantu iha supervizaun no rekursu.

Iha 2006, Dili sai hanesan episentru ba krize sosiál. Tensaun permanente sira ne’ebé naruk iha polísia no forsa defeza nasionál (F-FDTL) nia laran nakfera ba battala no hamosu konfrontasaun entre viziñu sira. krize ne’e halo ema nain 37 mak mate no desloka ema besik 150,000. Iha Maiu 2006, forsa internasionál nian ida mobilizadu no operasaun sira hahú atu restaura ordem. Siguransa Rai-laran nian ikus mai hetan fiar hosi kontijénsia forte hosi Polísia Nasoen Unidas nian hamutuk 1,542 (UNPOL) no Forsa Estabilizasaun Internasionál Austrália no tropas Nova Zelandia nian ne’ebé kompostu hamutuk nain 920.

Iha tempu krize mosu, ronda foun ida hosi reforma polísia nian hahú ona. Ho administrasaun ONU (UNMIT) nian ida ne’ebé too mai, asisténsia no atensaun internasionál nian foka liu ba kestaun sira dezempeñu nian nomós tensaun sira no entre PNTL no FFDTL. Mandatu ofisiál UNMIT nian inklui restorasaun no manutensaun hosi siguransa públiku too PNTL nu’udar rekonstruídu fila fali ona. Iha Dezembru 2006 UNMIT no governu Timor-Leste asina ona Akordu Suplementar ba Polisiamentu, ne’ebé hatúr planu sira tuir mai ba rekonstituisaun no reforma ba PNTL. Konsentrasaun hosi esforsu sira UNMIT nian mak re-análize, treinamentu, no mentór ofisiál sira; no too medida ki’ik ida, haforsa instituisionál.

Durante eleisaun parliamentár no prezidensiál 2007 kontén esplosaun violénsia ne’ebé mak lokalizadu no lalais. Hafoin ne’e iha loron 11 fulan Fevereiru, 2008 iha atake ba Prezidente Jose Ramos Horta no Primeiru Ministru Xanana Gusmao ne’ebé halais governu hodi deklara estadu de sítiu ida durante fulan tolu no forma Komando Konjuntu. Governu konsidera Percepsaun Polisia-Communidade katak, PNTL no F-FDTL servisu hamutuk ho diak hodi detein rebelde restante balun hosi krize 2006 nian no halo mediasaun ba sira nia entrega aan pasífiku. Governu taka ona kampu IDP nian besik 45 no fasilita ona familia hamutuk liu 6,500 hodi fila ba sira nia uma ho tempu ne’eba relatóriu peskiza ne’e hala’o ona.

Maski iha prezensa internasionál nian, iha oho malu tamba odiu malu ho númeru ne’ebé boot hosi fulan Maiu 2006 too fulan Marsu 2007 hanesa rezultadu hosi krize 2006 nian, oho malu sira ne’e barak mak akontese ona iha Dili. Meilloramentu intermus ba siguransa halo ona iha Dili. Membru komunidade sira rezumu hodi lao halimar iha estrada iha tempu kalan no halo meiloramentu sira ba sira nia propriedade. Rezultadu hosi PNTL estabelese Task Force ida ho ofisiál polísia 100 iha fulan Deembru 2007 hodi haforsa siguransa públiku nian iha kapital nasaun ne’e nian. Hatudu aumentu ki’ik ida hosi tinan 2007, rekorde kriminilidade 2008 UNMIT nian kontén insidente hamutuk 3094: prinsipalmente asaltu, desordem públiku no disputa doméstika sira. UNMIT fiar katak tarefa krimi verdade nian deklina enkuantu reportajen krimi nian aumenta. Iha fulan sira ne’e tuir fali kriasaun ba Task Force Dili nian iha alegasaun sira konaba “uzu forsa no tratamentu ladik ne’ebé esesivu durante detensaun, buka uma sira ho illegal no hahalok abuzu”, bazeia ba relatóriu 2007/2008 UNMIT nian konaba Direitu Ema nian no Dezenvolvimentu iha Timor-Leste.

Prosesu resertifikasaun ONU nian ne’ebé mak estabelese ona hodi análize ofisiál PNTL sira besik ona atu hotu iha tinan ikus 2008. Iha fulan Novembru 2008, membru PNTL nain 234 labele servisu lai ba resertifikasaun tamba alegasaun sira konaba involvimentu iha atividade sira ne’ebé la legál. Maski nune’e too agora laiha membru PNTL sira mak serví ona sentensa ida ba krimi ida, maski ofisiál balun simu ona adverténsia sira ofisiál nian. Sistema justisa, rasik hanesan fatór emerjente ida estadu nian, ne’ebé limita ona kapasidade prokuradória nian hodi infrenta kazu hirak-ne’e ho sufisenti. Servisu hosi Prokuradór Jerál nian ne’ebé hala’o akumulasaun ida hosi kazu kriminalidade hamutuk 4,700 no iha deit tribunal distritu rua entre distritu haat mak funsiona lor-loron.

PNTL kontinua nafatin halao kna’ar ho rekursu sira ne’ebe mak mínimu kontráriu ho sira nia kontrapartida UNPOL sira. PNTL laiha sistema radio ne’ebe funsiona – ofisiál sira uza fali radio rede ONU nian ka sira nia telemovél pesoál nian; menus kareta ida ba kada ofisiál PNTL nain nen; no komputador hamutuk 46 ba forsa polísia tomak hodi halo dokumentasaun ka rai fingerprints. Iha kompensasaun no insentivu ne’ebe kiik liu, no ofisiál sira simu $125 ful-fulan.

Maski iha limitasaun konsideravel hirak ne’e, iha tinan 2008 PNTL halo ona ninia progresu rasik. Esforsu hodi reforma polítika interna halao ona, inklui treinamentu ba membru pesoál rasik sein asisténsia internsionál. PNTL nia Akademia Formasaun Nasionál halao ninia avaliasaun ba nesesidade treinamentu, determina hodi halibur nesesidade intelijénsia iha Dili laran nomos iha distritu sira, no halo dezeñu ba kurríkulu kursu nian. Governu mos aprova ona Rejime kareira no Rejime Salariu nian ba PNTL.

Iha tinan 2008 iha ona diskusaun ne’ebe lao nafatin entre ONU no Governu Timor-Leste konaba tranzisaun distritu-ba-distritu autoridade polísia nian hosi UNPOL ba PNTL. Tuir fali, prosesu entrega autoridade ne’e kala atu hahú iha sedu liu mak iha fulan tolu primeiru tinan 2009.

FM: Atu hetan relatorio kompletu click iha ne’e SurveyReportFinalTRANSLATEDTETUN-1.pdf

East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin: New Masters thesis: Thomas Stratton: Going Over Old Ground

East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin: New Masters thesis: Thomas Stratton: Going Over Old Ground.

THE 7th IISS ASIAN SECURITY SUMMIT SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE – Julio Tomas Pinto

Singapore

Sunday 1 June 2007

RESTORING PEACE IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

Dr Julio Tomas Pinto, Secretary of State for Defense, Timor-Leste

As delivered – provisional transcript

Thank you Mr Chairman, and thank you for inviting us to share information about the Timor-Leste experience in emergency situations.  I would like to use this opportunity to express our government’s sympathy and condolences to the people of Myanmar, and the Chinese people.  My presentation focuses on restoring peace in emergency situations in East Timor.

Timor-Leste has lived through too many conflicts and emergencies in the past 10 years.  The first crisis was in 1999 and the second was in 2006.  In 1999 the people of Timor-Leste voted for independence.  In the aftermath a major crisis developed in the region from those who lost out in the popular vote.   In 1999 it is estimated that a quarter of the population, 250k people, were displaced, and up to 75% of the Tutus were affected.  A massive multi-agency response to the complex humanitarian emergency was launched and coordinated by the UN, which assumed executive power in the absence of a sovereign government.  The humanitarian assistance was coordinated with the UN along with the bilateral development partners, who had the monopoly of resources and technical expertise.  Along with the differences resulting from the specific dynamic of the crisis, there was desolation from the local political pressures, and consideration of this merited the response to this emergency.

From April to May 2006 the internally generated crisis evolved into mass protests, and the division of the security forces in Sudan.  Government mismanagement contributed to the crisis in 2006.   Armed conflict was quickly brought under control, but political tension remained strong for a period of almost two years.  Unresolved social problems, and a small group of armed rebels were discovered only last month.  As in the case of all complex emergency situations, the response to the 1999 crisis, was initially focused on meeting the emergency security centres, and all the basic needs of the population.  The immediate needs of the population were met relatively quickly in 1999, but the long-term effect of the crisis and the response contributed to the dynamic that resulted in the 2006 crisis.  Given the destruction of infrastructure in 1999, and the main challenges related to absence of government structures, the immediate humanitarian response was extremely positive.   The security needs of the population were largely and quickly met.  This was due in part to the exemplary conduct of the former fighters, who remained on the continent, and were effectively reintegrated into the new security forces.  This contrasts with other countries, where humanitarian response and early stages of social rebuilding have been more challenging.

Where it could be said that the first emergency response was quick and effective, the transition to sustainable economic recovery and development proved significantly more challenging.  The 2006 was an internal crisis that required the response of the newly created institution.  The new institution led the immediate emergency response, but the dynamic of the conflict involved internal division in the police and armed forces, as well as momentary mistrust in both institutions.  This limited the scope of the involvement of the security or defence forces in the response.  The role of the armed forces was influenced by the consideration beyond that normally associated with the role of the armed forces in humanitarian responses generally.  This led to international involvement in the internal security arrangements of Timor-Leste.

In May 2006 the government of Timor-Leste met with the governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal, who provided military and police to the government of Timor-Leste.  I would like to use this opportunity to thanks the governments of Malaysia, New Zealand, Portugal and Australia.   Bilateral assistance was deployed extremely quickly, but was difficult to coordinate.  The government requested a new UN mission to take charge of law enforcement.  In 2006 the UN Security Council extended the scope of the unit and mission in Timor-Leste.  The UN was, and still is, mandated to ensure the restoration and maintenance of public security in Timor-Leste through the provision of support to Timor-Leste national police.  The Security Council resolution also called for international security forces to fully cooperate with and provide assistance to implement the mandate.  We currently have an Australian international security force in Timor-Leste.  The governments of Timor-Leste, Australia, and the UN established a trilateral coordination to discuss security issues relevant to the management and establishment of the security involvement in Timor-Leste.  This included not only the security operations, but also full coordination between the participants, through consultation and information sharing.  During this period the national and international security forces participated, not only ensuring security, but also in assisting as the humanitarian institutes performed their tasks of providing for the population.

The trilateral coordination arrangement was the basic form in which this coordination was established.  Other arrangements were created within the Ministry of Social Solidarity, to coordinate civil assistance and military operation in the emergency situation.  The trilateral coordination forum prepared a matrix based on trade analysed with the basis of assigning static security to different security forces, including national police and army forces, based on the degree of trade.

In 2007 regular elections were held according to the constitution, and the planning of security arrangements were coordinated within this trilateral forum.  The security of hundreds of polling stations across the country, and all related logistical preparations was coordinated with the assistance of the UN.  The trilateral arrangements performed very well, and required the coordination of all national and international security forces, like our national military, national police and international security forces.  This ensured the elections were held in a peaceful and free environment.  The challenges called for a more sustainable response, which was hard to assimilate within the classic emergency system.

Recognising the need to ensure an integrated government response to the multi layered nature of the crisis, the government developed and approved a comprehensive five pillar national recovery strategy.  They provided the specific framework to transition from emergency response to recovery and development.  In 2007, reaching international agreement was a national priority.  One of the national priorities was the security sector.

On 11 February 2008, an attempt was made on the lives of the President and Prime Minister Timor-Leste.  This was taken very seriously by the president of the republic, Dr Jose Ramos-Horta, which was perpetuated by the arm group that perpetuated the crisis in 2006.  On the 12 February 2008 a state of emergency was declared, and joint command established between the military and the police, our national defence force and our national defence.  They carried on all security operations resulting from the state of emergency.  Let me point out that the mission of the joint comment ensured the capture of the rebels, and surrender of all their weapons without the use of force.  This was possible only because its strategy was based on the need to obtain a long-term solution, due to a close operation between security and defence forces.

The perception by the population ensured the newly achieved cooperation between the police and the army was credible and sustained, which has been a major factor in the continued popular support of the government, isolating the rebel group.  The experience of Timor-Leste in dealing with complex emergencies and crisis informs our present reflection on the future rule of armed forces in national emergencies, and the restructuring of our security sector.  Timor-Leste is undertaking a major review of security sector reform, and we will develop a strategy based on basic principles, and linking the reform and development of the security sector to the national interests: peace, development and the wellbeing of citizens.  Reinforcing social cohesion will be central to our restoration of national cohesion.  The positive result of operational cooperation between the army and the police force is an important blueprint to plan an integrated system of forces, able to prevent political and military crises, and to intervene in future civil emergencies.

A new national disaster management plan is explicit in the allocation of the role of armed forces in future emergencies.  Security, transportation and logistical support for the armed forces is key to participation.  We have been through these crises, and we need to develop a culture of conflict prevention.  This is an urgent and challenging factor in our current security concerns.  Finally, after 24 years wanting independence, our state is barely six years old.  In this short time we have faced many challenges, but have also made important achievements in state building.  However, the security situation has been preventing us from addressing our main challenges of achieving sustained economic and social development. This is a small insight into the Timor-Leste experience of restoring peace in complex emergencies.

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