MAHEIN NIA LIAN NO. 13: Komunikadu da Imprenza: Kna’ar Falintil – Forsa Defesa Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) iha Faze Ukun Rasik A’an husi 2002 – 2010.

Fundasaun Mahein 28 Outubru 2010

Iha Fundasaun Mahein nia Lian edisaun no. 13 fokus ba iha Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (FALINTIL) hatudu ona nia didikasaun no komitmentu durante okupasaun Indonezia ne’ebe sai hanesan mos fundasaun ida ba F-FDTL sai Defesa Nasional ne’ebe iha prinsipiu neutraliadade iha sistema politik demokrasia Timor-Leste ninia. Mesmu F-FDTL nia abut husi partidu Fretilin ne’ebe nudar organizasaun hahoris naran Falintil, maibe transformasaun Falintil ba F-FDTL tenki iha prinsipiu imparsialidade atu garantia independesia no submete lolos nia a’an ba regras no leis iha rai Republika Demokratika Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste tama faze foun ona ho sistema forsa defesa nasional nebe sei buka lolos koloka kna’ar forsa defesa ninia atu labele iha konflitus politika siguransa iha rai laran. Premeira ves iha Timor-Leste nia istoria akontese instituisaun siguransa nasional hanesan F-FDTL no Polisia Nasional Timor-Leste (PNTL) sai hanesan hun ba konflitu no instabilidade iha tinan 2006.

Timor-Leste parese hatene katak laos selebrasaun mak sai hanesan objetivu fundamental ida ba instituisaun militar para tinan-tinan selebra nia aniversariu, maibe instituisaun militar ne’e persiza hare fila fali katak iha ona tinan walu (8) nia laran sai hanesan instituisaun formal militar ida iha nasaun demokratiku, persiza komesa hametin fundasaun disiplina no profesionalismu militar ba membru sira, ho objetivu katak militar tenki ho mentalidade atu defende interese povu laos interese institusionalidade (institusionalismu). Kestaun ne’e bele hare klean liu, tamba instituisaun laos atu representa grupu ou instituisaun maibe tenki halo sira nia kna’ar tuir konstituisaun haruka, “servisu militar halo tuir lei haruka.” Bazeia legal ne’e importante tebes ba membru militar sira wainhira sira halao servisu militar ninia no nee mos bele prevene politiku nain sira atu intervene ba organizasaun militar ninia. Leitura ida nee tenta atu examina kna’ar Forsa Defesa Timor-Leste liu husi loron nia asume responsabilidade hanesan forsa defeza nasional Timor-Leste iha 20 Maiu 2002 to’o 2010.

Wainhira asembleia nasional aprova konstituisaun no Timor-oan sira ofisialmente deklara Timor-Leste sai rai ida soberanu iha loron 20 Maiu 2002, iha tempu hanesan F-FDTL mos sai formalmente representa militar nasaun ida. Iha kapasidade profesionalismu no fasilidade ne’ebe limitadu teb-tebes, Timor-Leste konsege hahu instituisaun militar ida ne’ebe ho fiar ida katak sei lori interese nasional liu sasan hotu-hotu no garantia soberanu Timor-Leste. Iha FM nia relatoriu ne’e deskobre katak “dezenvolve forsa ida atu proteze Timor-oan husi ameasa liur, tulun azensia guvernu sira no hari’i ami nia rai.” Boa vontade husi Timor-Leste atu hari’i instituisaun militar hetan reasaun positivu husi komunidade internasional liu husi asistensia nasaun bar-barak. Liu husi kanal bilaterais husi Portugal, Australia, Estadu Unidos, Cina, Malaizia noTailandia liu husi treinamentu rai laran no liur, fo ikipamentu, hari’i fasilidade no treinamentu kona ba ajuda logistiku ninia.

Iha FM nia relatoriu ne’e mos deklara katak politikamente to’o ohin loron strutura liders F-FDTL sei domina husi eis membrus Falintil sira i maioria sira hotu foin mak apariende no hetan treinamentu profesional militar iha tempu badak idepois Timor-Leste hetan independensia. Nee mos sai obstaklu ida ba mediu prazu ninia atu dezenvolve lolos instituisaun militar ida ho independente no profesional tamba sei defisil ituan atu haketak Falinitl no F-FDTL.  Rees ispilika katak, “momentu transformasaun F-FDTL hanesan halo lalais liu, ne’e duni defisil ituan haketak F-FDTL husi nia abut Falintil, atu haketak sira bele hamosu interpertasaun negativu no bele interperta sala ba nia future dirasaun.” Husi kestaun nee bele dehan katak F-FDTL sidauk halao nia funsaun totalmente hanesan instituisaun militar profesional tamba emosionalmente no pisikoloziamente membrus eis Falintil sei defisil adapta no koloka sira nia a’an ba regras instituisaun militar. Istoria Falintil bele influenza hahalok no politika F-FDTL ninia iha kualker tempu.

Iha relatoriu ne’e mos FM rekomenda ba estadu no guvernu Timor-Leste iha area balun hakas a’an ona atu dezenvolve ninia instituisaun forsa armada sai hanesan militar profesional nebe hakruk a’an ba povu nia interese, espesialmente sivil mak kontrola institusaun militar ninia (Military under civilian control). Kestaun nee bele aplika iha Timor-Leste wainhira elementus hotu-hotu iha vontade politika atu kaer metin prinsipiu militar iha rai demokratiku. Timor-Leste persiza kria kondisaun ida par povu mak bele halo kontrolizasaun ba kna’ar militar ninia, liu-liu sosidade sivil bele iha kapasidade atu bele halo kontribuisaun no dezenvolvimentu atu kontrola lalaok militar. “Iha rai ida demokratika, sosidade sivil tenki bele hanoin halo nusa bele fo apoiu ideas par bele kontrola milita. Konaba aspeitu ida ne’e, estadu no guvernu nebe kaer pasta politika forsa defesa nia persiza mos involve sosidade sivil atu bele hatene klean liu kona ba politika defesa nia. Ministeriu Defesa hanesan parte sivil halo dadauk politika defesa nia, purtantu Timor-Leste bele dehan sivil mos hola parte ba prosesu hari’i funsionamentu F-FDTL.” Prosesu ne’e bele interperta katak sivil komesa iha parte ida kontrola lalaok militar nia liu husi alokasaun orsamentu halo politika atu hari’i no hametin instituisaun militar tuir regras demokrasia Timor-Leste ninia.

Instituisaun militar persiza hadia mentalidade membrus sira husi veteranu resistensia ba militar profesional no hanoin nasional ba kontekstu standar internasional. Membru sira persiza hasae sira nia matenek liu husi trainamentu no haruka sira bele iskola tan iha universidade konaba assuntus lei nian, justisa, direitus, saude buat seluk-seluk tan. Unversidade sira rai laran no liur mos bele servisu hamutuk ho instituisaun militar bele iha intreasaun enter estudante sira atraves husi siminariu, estaziu, peskiza, despotu, servisu sosial ho parte seluk-seluk tan. Instituisaun militar persiza loke a’an ba publiku para simu kritikas, sugestaun no intereasaun direitamente entre povu ho membru militar sira, nune sira bele hatene no habesik a’an ba instituisaun nee, loke mos debates ou siminariu bar-barak konaba kna’ar F-FDTL iha rai ida demokratiku.

Atu hatene klean liu konaba asuntu ne’e bele kontaktu.

Hetan relatoriu iha ne’e.

Nélson Belo,

Direktor Fundasaun Mahein

Web: www.fundasaunmahein.wordpress.com

Email: direktor.mahein[at]gmail.com

Tlp: +670 737 4222

Fundasaun Mahein, October  28,  2010

Press Release

Falintil-Forca Defensa Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) in the Era of Independence, 2002 to 2010.

In the 13th Mahein’s Voice (Mahein Nia Lian No. 13 in English) focuses to Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (FALINTIL) showed its dedication and commitment during the Indonesian occupation and became the foundation for F-FDTL, a national defense force that has the principle of neutrality within the democratic political system of Timor Leste. Although F-FDTL’s roots come from the FRETILIN party  the organization that produced the name FALINTIL- the transformation of FALINTIL to F-FDTL must have the principle of impartiality, in order to guarantee independence and truly submit itself to the regulations and laws of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste. Timor Leste has entered a new phase  that searches for the right place and function of the defense force so that there is no conflict of security policy  in the country. For the first time in the history of Timor Leste, national security institutions such as F-FDTL and Timor Leste National Police (PNTL) became a major source of conflict and instability in 2006.

Timor Leste surely knows that celebrating their aniversary every year is not the fundamental objective of the military, but that the military institution needs to focus on how during eight years of becoming a formal military institution in a democratic country, they have continued to strengthen the foundation of discipline and military professionalism of their members, with a purpose of creating a military with a mentality of defending the interests of the people, not the interest of the institution (Institutionalism). An institution should not represent groups or institutions, but do its duty as the constitution requires. “Military duty is to follow the order of the Constitution”. This legal basis is very important for military members when they carry out their military duties as this can prevent politicians from intervening with military organisations. This article attempts to examine the role of F-FDTL since the day it acquired responsiblity as Timor Leste’s national defense force from 20 May 2002 until the present.

When the National Assembly approved the constitution and the East Timorese declared Timor Leste a sovereign nation-state on 20 May 2002,  the  F-FDTL also formally became the military representative of this country. With a very limited professional capacity and a lack of facilities, Timor Leste managed to form a military institution with the belief of considering the national interest over other things and guaranteeing the sovereignity of Timor Leste. In FM’s report also found that, “develop a force to protect the people of Timor Leste from outside threat, help the governmental agencies, and build our country”. The goodwill of Timor Leste in forming a military institution recieved positive feedback from the international community through the assistace of many countries – bilateral agreements with Portugal, Australia, the United States, China, Malaysia, and Thailand regarding both in-country training and training abroad, providing equipment, building facilities, and training about logistic assistance

In FM’s report said that, politically, the leadership structure of F-FDTL to this date is still dominated by the ex-members of FALINTIL and a majority of them learned and received professional military training for only a very short time after Timor Leste gained its independence. This is an obstacle to really developing a military institution that is independent and professional because it is  diffcult to separate FALINTIL and F-FDTL. Edward Rees explains that “the moment of F-FDTL transformation was too soon so it is quite difficult to separate F-FDTL from its root FALINTIL because separating them could cause negative interpretation and wrong interpretation to its future direction.” From this case, it could be said that F-FDTL has not achieved its function completely as a professional military institution because emotionally and psycologically members of ex FALINTIL have difficulty adapting and putting themselves under the regulations of the military institution. The history of FALINTIL has the ability to influence the behavior and politics of F-FDTL at any time.

In the report FM also recommends that, the State or governent of Timor Leste has forced their army institution in some ways to become a more professional military that bows to the interest of the people, especially by putting the military under civilian control. This case will be fully applied in Timor Leste when all the members have the political willingness to hold the military to the principles of a democratic country. Timor Leste needs to create a condition where its’ people can control the military. Civil society can contribute to the development of military activities. “In a democratic country, civil society should be able to think about how to give supportive ideas to control the military. Along these lines, the government that makes defence force policy also needs to involve civil society more, in order for them to know more about defense policy.The Ministry of Defense, as well as civil society, is making defence policy. It could be said that civilians can also take part in the process of development of F-FDTL in Timor Leste. This process could be interpreted as civilians begining to control military activity through budget allocation to make policies that build and strenghten the military institution according to the regulations of democratic Timor Leste.

The military institution needs to improve the mentality of its members, moving from that ofa resistance organization to that of a professional military, who think in the context of international standards. They need to increase their knowledge through training and also attend university where they can study law, justice, rights, health and other things. Universities in this country and abroad can also work together with the military institution to have an interaction between students.  This could involve seminars, research, sports, social services, and other components. The military institution needs to be open when receiving public criticisms and suggestions, and increase their direct interactions with the people so that they know and get close to the institution. Open debates and seminars about the role of F-FDTL in a democratic country are also useful in helping the public understand what F-FDTL actually does.

For more informasaun on this issue, please contact

To download the report in english click here.

Nélson Belo,

Director of Fundasaun Mahein

Web: www.fundasaunmahein.wordpress.com

Email: direktor.mahein[at]gmail.com

tlp :  +670 737 4222

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MAHEIN NIA LIAN No. 6: Komunikadu da Imprenza, Grupu ho Kilat Ilegal iha Timor Leste (Tetun)

Fundasaun Mahein 7 Junhu 2010

Komunikadu da Imprenza

Grupu ho Kilat Ilegal iha Timor Leste

Fundasaun Mahein www.fundasaunmahein.wordpress.com hanesan ONG nasional nebe halo monitorizasaun, peskiza ho advokasia ba seitor siguransa iha Timor Leste.

Iha fulan ne’e Fundasaun Mahein (FM), hasai relatoriu ida ba publiku ho nia titlu: “Kilat Ilegal ho Grupu Ilegal iha Timor Leste” relatoriu ne’e foka ba akontesementu Ninja, Grupu Ilegal ho Kilat Ilegal husi fulan Fevereiru 2010 to mai operasasaun PNTL iha distritu Bobonaro ho Suai. Iha relatoriu ida ne’e ami inklui mos rumores nebe despalha iha komunidade katak grupu illegal tiru malun ho COE (Comando Operasaun Especial) iha loron 16 Maiu 2010, iha distriu Ermera.

Hanesan ita hotu hatene katak Grupu illegal ho kilat laos buat ida ke foun iha historia Timor-Leste nian. Komesa iha 1975 wainhira Portugez husik hela Timor-Lesta, depois mai fali iha tempu okupasaun militar Indonezia to’o eventu konsulta popular iha 1999. Ikus liu maka krize politika-militar iha 2006. Eventu nebe maka akontese iha Ermera foin dadaun, hanesan kontinuasaun deit husi krize nebe maka akontese tiha ona iha pasadu.

Iha relatoriu ne’e mos FM fo sai katak isu grupu ho kilat ilegal ne’e laos issue bain-bain. Bazea ba dadus nebe maka FM kolekta, FM konklui katak iha duni problema instabilidade ida ke seriu iha rai laran. Maibe to’o oras ne’e dadaun seidauk iha instituisaun governu ida maka fo deklarasaun klaru kona ba grupu ne’e kompostu husi se se no kilat hira maka sira sei iha. Depois de Timor-Leste ukun rasik a’an instituisaun sira ne’e mos seidauk halo esforsu hodi halo rekolha kilat nebe sei namkari iha rai laran.

FM mos fo rekomendasaun balun, mak hanesan, husu  Ministru Defeza e Siguransa atu halo audit kilat iha armajem PNTL ho F-FDTL nian kada tinan tinan liu husi Parlementu Nasional Komisaun B konaba kilat hira mak sei lakon e hira mak iha armajem.

FM rekomenda katak preciza kria sistema informasaun ida ke integradu atu halo ko’ordinasaun ida ke  diak entre membrus PNTL iha distritu tomak, Quartel Geral PNTL iha Dili no Servisu Nasional da Inteligensia (SNI). Koordenasaun mos importante para PNTL atu hasai apelu ruma ba publiku tenke bazea ba dadus konkreta iha tereinu no realidade nebe akontese para atu la bele kria paniku iha povu nia le’et.

FM mos rekomenda katak iha futuru governu tenke fo atensaun makas ba PNTL ba Unidade Polisia Komunitaria atu bele halo sira nia dever no hakbesik liu tan ba komunidade atu bele atende sira nia kazu hodi prevene violensia.

FM mos rekomenda katak iha operasaun saida deit PNTL tenki respeita propriedade komunidade nian, komesa husi ai horis to’o animal[1] nebe maka komunidade sira hakiak.

Atu hatene klean liu konaba asuntu ne’e bele kontaktu Nélson Belo, Direktor Fundasaun Mahein, Atu hetan relatoriu Fundasaun Mahein Nia Lian ne bele asesu husi Web:  www.fundasaunmahein.wordpress.com ou tlp ba : +670 737 4222

Bele hetan relatorio iha ne’e.


Fundasaun Mahein 7 June 2010

Press Release

Illegal group and illegal weapons in Timor Leste

Fundasaun Mahein is a national NGO whose purpose is to monitor, conduct research, and advocate policy options for the Timorese security sector. This month Fundasaun Mahein (FM), is going to release a report to the public with the title: “Illegal weapons and illegal groups in Timor Leste.” This report will focus on Ninja activities, and the Illegal groups and illegal weapons incident which occurred during February 2010, up to the recent PNTL operations in the districts of Bobonaro and Suai.  This report will also talk about the escalation of rumors that were spread in the community about a confrontation and shootout between an illegal group and the COE (Especial Command Operation) of PNTL on May 16, 2010 in the district of Ermera.

We all know that illegal groups and illegal weapons are not new in the history of Timor Leste.  Many such groups and weapons are left over from when the Portuguese departed in 1975, with the proliferation continuing all throughout the Indonesian military occupation which lasted up to the time of the referendum in 1999.  During the political-military crisis of 2006 we saw again the deployment of illegal weapons to civilians.  We consider the recent Ermera situation, as a sad continuation of the past.

Based on the facts that Fundasaun Mahein has collected, we can conclude that there are serious problems of instability in the nation.  But, at the current time there are no relevant government institutions that have formally declared who belongs to these groups and how many weapons they possess.  After Timor Leste achieved independence, these institutions of government did not make much effort to collect all the illegal weapons still scattered around the country.

FM recommends to both Ministers of Defense and Security for them to order an annual audit of the weapons in the armories of both PNTL and F-FDTL.  This audit should be carried out through the National Parliament Commission B and should include a list of the missing weapons and the existing inventory of weapons in both armories.

Fundasaun Mahein also acknowledges that there is a need for more adequate communication among the security institutions, and recomends the establishment of an intergrated system of sharing information which enables better coordination between PNTL members in the districts, PNTL Headquaters in Dili, and the National Intelligence Service (SNI). This type of coordination is important so that when an annoucement is made by PNTL to the public, it has already been shared with and vetted by other relevant  security institutions, and is based on concrete data, so there is no confusion, and we avoid the possibility of a public panic.

Fundasun Mahein recommends that in the future the Government must give their full attention to PNTL, especialy PNTL’s Community Police Unit and make sure they comply with their duties and establish close links with the community in order to attend to their issues and prevent future conflicts.

FM also highly recommends that in their every day operations, PNTL show full respect to the private property of individuals in the community, including plantations and gardens to pet animals and livestock for which people are the owners and caretakers.

For further information regarding this report, please contact

Nelson Belo, Director, Fundasaun Mahein

www.fundasaunmahein.wordpress.com email.direktor.mahein@gmail.com ,

tlp +670 737 4222

Download the English version here.

Lei Defeza Nacional / National Defence Law 2009

Lei Defeza ne’e Fundasaun Mahien seidauk bele hetan iha lian Tetun. Agora dadaun FM hetan deit copia iha lian ingles deit e FM kontinua buka atu hetan iha versaun Tetun.

Fundasaun Mahien does not yet have this National Defence Law in Tetun. Currently, FM has only obtained the English version and FM is continuing to try to obtain the Tetun version.

Lei_Defeza_Nacional_2009.doc

Secretario Sira de Defeza no Seguranza Abril 2009.

Secretario de Defeza (Julio Tomas Pinto), no Secretario de Seguranza (Fransisco Guterres) koalia kona ba sira nia planu atu atu reforma FALINTIL-FDTL no PNTL iha 3-4 Abril 2009.

Atu “download” click pdf ida kraik. Disculpa, Ingles deit, tanba sira fo sira nia hanoin ba malae barak iha Reuniaun Praseiru Dezenvolvimentu Timor‐Leste 3-4 Abril 2009 (TLDPM).

Secretario de Defeza (Julio Tomas Pinto)

speech-secretaryofstatefordefense.pdf

Secretario de Seguranza (Fransisco Guterres)

speech-secretaryofstateforsecurity.pdf

THE 7th IISS ASIAN SECURITY SUMMIT SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE – Julio Tomas Pinto

Singapore

Sunday 1 June 2007

RESTORING PEACE IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

Dr Julio Tomas Pinto, Secretary of State for Defense, Timor-Leste

As delivered – provisional transcript

Thank you Mr Chairman, and thank you for inviting us to share information about the Timor-Leste experience in emergency situations.  I would like to use this opportunity to express our government’s sympathy and condolences to the people of Myanmar, and the Chinese people.  My presentation focuses on restoring peace in emergency situations in East Timor.

Timor-Leste has lived through too many conflicts and emergencies in the past 10 years.  The first crisis was in 1999 and the second was in 2006.  In 1999 the people of Timor-Leste voted for independence.  In the aftermath a major crisis developed in the region from those who lost out in the popular vote.   In 1999 it is estimated that a quarter of the population, 250k people, were displaced, and up to 75% of the Tutus were affected.  A massive multi-agency response to the complex humanitarian emergency was launched and coordinated by the UN, which assumed executive power in the absence of a sovereign government.  The humanitarian assistance was coordinated with the UN along with the bilateral development partners, who had the monopoly of resources and technical expertise.  Along with the differences resulting from the specific dynamic of the crisis, there was desolation from the local political pressures, and consideration of this merited the response to this emergency.

From April to May 2006 the internally generated crisis evolved into mass protests, and the division of the security forces in Sudan.  Government mismanagement contributed to the crisis in 2006.   Armed conflict was quickly brought under control, but political tension remained strong for a period of almost two years.  Unresolved social problems, and a small group of armed rebels were discovered only last month.  As in the case of all complex emergency situations, the response to the 1999 crisis, was initially focused on meeting the emergency security centres, and all the basic needs of the population.  The immediate needs of the population were met relatively quickly in 1999, but the long-term effect of the crisis and the response contributed to the dynamic that resulted in the 2006 crisis.  Given the destruction of infrastructure in 1999, and the main challenges related to absence of government structures, the immediate humanitarian response was extremely positive.   The security needs of the population were largely and quickly met.  This was due in part to the exemplary conduct of the former fighters, who remained on the continent, and were effectively reintegrated into the new security forces.  This contrasts with other countries, where humanitarian response and early stages of social rebuilding have been more challenging.

Where it could be said that the first emergency response was quick and effective, the transition to sustainable economic recovery and development proved significantly more challenging.  The 2006 was an internal crisis that required the response of the newly created institution.  The new institution led the immediate emergency response, but the dynamic of the conflict involved internal division in the police and armed forces, as well as momentary mistrust in both institutions.  This limited the scope of the involvement of the security or defence forces in the response.  The role of the armed forces was influenced by the consideration beyond that normally associated with the role of the armed forces in humanitarian responses generally.  This led to international involvement in the internal security arrangements of Timor-Leste.

In May 2006 the government of Timor-Leste met with the governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal, who provided military and police to the government of Timor-Leste.  I would like to use this opportunity to thanks the governments of Malaysia, New Zealand, Portugal and Australia.   Bilateral assistance was deployed extremely quickly, but was difficult to coordinate.  The government requested a new UN mission to take charge of law enforcement.  In 2006 the UN Security Council extended the scope of the unit and mission in Timor-Leste.  The UN was, and still is, mandated to ensure the restoration and maintenance of public security in Timor-Leste through the provision of support to Timor-Leste national police.  The Security Council resolution also called for international security forces to fully cooperate with and provide assistance to implement the mandate.  We currently have an Australian international security force in Timor-Leste.  The governments of Timor-Leste, Australia, and the UN established a trilateral coordination to discuss security issues relevant to the management and establishment of the security involvement in Timor-Leste.  This included not only the security operations, but also full coordination between the participants, through consultation and information sharing.  During this period the national and international security forces participated, not only ensuring security, but also in assisting as the humanitarian institutes performed their tasks of providing for the population.

The trilateral coordination arrangement was the basic form in which this coordination was established.  Other arrangements were created within the Ministry of Social Solidarity, to coordinate civil assistance and military operation in the emergency situation.  The trilateral coordination forum prepared a matrix based on trade analysed with the basis of assigning static security to different security forces, including national police and army forces, based on the degree of trade.

In 2007 regular elections were held according to the constitution, and the planning of security arrangements were coordinated within this trilateral forum.  The security of hundreds of polling stations across the country, and all related logistical preparations was coordinated with the assistance of the UN.  The trilateral arrangements performed very well, and required the coordination of all national and international security forces, like our national military, national police and international security forces.  This ensured the elections were held in a peaceful and free environment.  The challenges called for a more sustainable response, which was hard to assimilate within the classic emergency system.

Recognising the need to ensure an integrated government response to the multi layered nature of the crisis, the government developed and approved a comprehensive five pillar national recovery strategy.  They provided the specific framework to transition from emergency response to recovery and development.  In 2007, reaching international agreement was a national priority.  One of the national priorities was the security sector.

On 11 February 2008, an attempt was made on the lives of the President and Prime Minister Timor-Leste.  This was taken very seriously by the president of the republic, Dr Jose Ramos-Horta, which was perpetuated by the arm group that perpetuated the crisis in 2006.  On the 12 February 2008 a state of emergency was declared, and joint command established between the military and the police, our national defence force and our national defence.  They carried on all security operations resulting from the state of emergency.  Let me point out that the mission of the joint comment ensured the capture of the rebels, and surrender of all their weapons without the use of force.  This was possible only because its strategy was based on the need to obtain a long-term solution, due to a close operation between security and defence forces.

The perception by the population ensured the newly achieved cooperation between the police and the army was credible and sustained, which has been a major factor in the continued popular support of the government, isolating the rebel group.  The experience of Timor-Leste in dealing with complex emergencies and crisis informs our present reflection on the future rule of armed forces in national emergencies, and the restructuring of our security sector.  Timor-Leste is undertaking a major review of security sector reform, and we will develop a strategy based on basic principles, and linking the reform and development of the security sector to the national interests: peace, development and the wellbeing of citizens.  Reinforcing social cohesion will be central to our restoration of national cohesion.  The positive result of operational cooperation between the army and the police force is an important blueprint to plan an integrated system of forces, able to prevent political and military crises, and to intervene in future civil emergencies.

A new national disaster management plan is explicit in the allocation of the role of armed forces in future emergencies.  Security, transportation and logistical support for the armed forces is key to participation.  We have been through these crises, and we need to develop a culture of conflict prevention.  This is an urgent and challenging factor in our current security concerns.  Finally, after 24 years wanting independence, our state is barely six years old.  In this short time we have faced many challenges, but have also made important achievements in state building.  However, the security situation has been preventing us from addressing our main challenges of achieving sustained economic and social development. This is a small insight into the Timor-Leste experience of restoring peace in complex emergencies.

Timor-Leste/Australia Hametin Akordu Defeza

DCP Talks Address Illegal Maritime Activities, English-Language Education
From Tempo Semanal Edition 145 29 June 2009

The Defence Cooperation Program, and Timor-Leste Government and Defence Force last week

Secretary of the State for Defence Dr Julio Tomas Pinto, F-FDTL Commander Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, and Director General of the Pacific and East Timor Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) Air Commodore Anthony Jones met on Friday 26 June 2009 with other members of the DCP to discuss the program’s progress and future plans.

A statement by the Defence Cooperation Program praised the F-FDTL’s progress since early 2008, and said, “The next twelve months will see an expansion in Australian Defence Cooperation Program activities to support the F-FDTL”.

Secretario do Estado de Defeze - Julio Tomas Pinto

Secretario do Estado de Defeze - Julio Tomas Pinto

The three representatives signed a document stating the DCP will expand “To support the continuing development of the F-FDTL,” by nearly doubling the capacity of F-FDTL’s English-Language Program at Metinaro; gradually increasing maritime security assistance; providing advanced infantry training for F-FDTL; and increasing cooperation in the fields of engineering and nation-building.

The document also stated that “Timor-Leste and Australia will continue to frankly exchange ideas on the implementation of defence cooperation activities and future areas of engagement between our two nations,” indicating hopes for honest and open communication when developing Timor-Leste’s future military capacity.

The talks’ dialogue embodied this agreed-upon frankness, with Air Commodore Jones stating that the DCP was particularly focused on expanding Timor-Leste’s naval capabilities through providing advisors to “develop their capability to patrol and protect the Timor-Leste maritime borders”, and in training F-FDTL patrol boat crews in Australia and Timor-Leste, “to protect the maritime environment”.

“We know the TL govt and the TL people are very concerned about what is going on in their exclusive economic zones and in their maritime areas, particularly in regard to illegal fishing. Australia’s very eager to support the TL govt in making sure their maritime boundary is secure, and that the activities that are going on in that exclusive economic zone are well-known and well-managed by the Timor-Leste govt,” said Air Commodore Jones.

Dr Tomas Pinto agreed that maritime security is a priority for Timor-Leste’s Defence authorities, stating, “The DCP talks are talking about how Australia will assist us to work together closely with the navy to control our sea. One of the important issues we talked about here is maritime surveillance. This is important also for TL,” said Dr Tomas Pinto.

Dr Tomas Pinto also said the Government of Timor-Leste is experiencing problems with illegal immigration from Bangladesh, and that it has requested assistance from the Australian Government to address this issue.

Air Commodore Jones and the Australian Ambassador to Timor-Leste, Phil Heywood, said the DCP would share with F-FDTL its information and experiences in speaking with the Indonesian navy about dealing with these issues, and in developing future “trilateral cooperation”.

All parties at the talks particularly appreciated the DCP’s decision to provide new instructors and facilities to the F-FDTL English-language program.

Air Commodore Jones said, “We understand that there was an increasing demand from F-FDTL for more English-language capacity, and we’re very happy to support that”.

“It really is the key to significant trainng opportunities.”

Air Commodore Jones also mentioned the new Australian Defence Minister would visit Timor-Leste within the next two to three months. The previous Defence Minister recently resigned following repeated allegations of improper conduct involving his brother and a Chinese businesswoman.

Air Commodore Jones thanked Dr Tomas Pinto and Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak for their support, saying, “I know it’s not often easy to accept and coordinate the activities that we provide, but we appreciate that”.

Dr Tomas Pinto ended the talks in saying to the Commodore, “Thanks for you, because Australia is still committed to helping us. We also thank Australia and New Zealand as well, because you assisted us in difficult times, and now you are assisting us again”.

Fundasaun Mahein hetan suporta husi SED.

Secretario do Estado de Defeze, Governo Republika Demokratika de Timor-Leste, suporta Fundasaun Mahein  atu hatu ami nia aktivitade no tuir ami deklarasaun misaun.
The Secretary of State for Defence, Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste supports Fundasaun Mahein to commence its activities in line with its mission statement.
Julio Tomas Pinto (SED) surat atu tulun Fundasaun Mahein

Julio Tomas Pinto (SED) surat atu tulun Fundasaun Mahein